Re: rv(64) address space size
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this would take some time. but to begin
separating kernel from user, provides both the first level of isolation. this can be further used for .hypervisor isolation trojan horse pointers protection etc i attached one snapshot from the kalsr paper and also mark hills presentation on spectre and meltdown KALSR does NOT solver the world’s security problems. it is only the beginning. and within the context if rv64 (maybe rv47) this helps, aand their suggestions maybe more adoptable within the current definitional framework if you have questions on the paper, for particular issues, please post them --------------------------------------------------
Could you clarify what suggestions you think we should implement? The KAISER paper describes a way of mitigating side channel attacks, but do you have specific lessons you think we should learn from it for designing sv64? WARNING / LEGAL TEXT: This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information which is privileged, confidential, proprietary, or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient or the person responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are strictly prohibited from disclosing, distributing, copying, or in any way using this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender and destroy and delete any copies you may have received. http://www.bsc.es/disclaimer ————— |
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