
Allen Baum
The sPMP proposal has not been discussed in any detail as far as I know, so it is hard to pin down. The advantage of sPMP is that it should be much lower cost and simpler compared to page-based virtual memory. The downside is there is no ability to relocate addresses - it is less flexible.
My understanding of the intent (which could be wrong, to be clear) is that it primarily targets an embedded system that had 3 privilege levels (M,S,U) but didn't need virtual memory. In such a system, the OS (S-mode) privilege level needs the ability to configure memory protection, but the existing PMP can only be configured by M-mode. sPMP was proposed to correct this.
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is defining an enhanced PMP, but it still only differentiates between M-mode and non-M-Mode; specifically, it doesn't differentiate between S-mode and U-mode protections. In any case, there have been no sPMP discussions in any TG that I'm aware of yet. That could happen in the TEE TG, but certainly not before the enhanced PMP work is finished .
toggle quoted message
Show quoted text
Is sPMP an alternative to page-based permissions? If so, what advantage does it provide over the latter?
Thanks,
Freddie
From: Andrew Waterman [mailto:andrew@...]
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 10:51 PM
To: Bill Huffman <huffman@...>
Cc: Jonathan Behrens <behrensj@...>; Xinhaoqu (Freddie) <xinhaoqu@...>; Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>; tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 3:46 PM Bill Huffman <huffman@...> wrote:
That might mean that the sPMP being considered might need a probe of some sort.
I'd tend to think that the user processes running under sPMP will have few enough data regions that software base-and-bounds checks on syscall arguments isn't prohibitively expensive.
Bill
On 10/30/20 3:39 PM, Jonathan Behrens wrote:
In the worst case, a software page table walk isn't that expensive.
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 2:46 PM Bill Huffman <huffman@...> wrote:
On 10/30/20 2:32 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) <xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions
lower their privilege level so that if they end up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations
that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR
has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then,
it engages SUM and performs the unprivileged access.
That's, of course, a very Linux centric answer. With more general address maps - or a "bare MMU" - the problem is harder to solve. Do you have an expectation for that case?
It's not especially Linux-centric; it's more conventional-OS-with-paging-centric.
mstatus.MPRV handles the situation adequately for PMP-based protection in M/U systems.
S-mode with general address maps is not adequately addressed here, but at least at the moment, that strikes me as a bit too hypothetical of a problem. If we did need to solve it, an S-mode MPRV feature would also suffice.
Bill
Regards,
Freddie
From:
tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc: tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
Is sPMP an alternative to page-based permissions? If so, what advantage does it provide over the latter?
Thanks,
Freddie
toggle quoted message
Show quoted text
From: Andrew Waterman [mailto:andrew@...]
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 10:51 PM
To: Bill Huffman <huffman@...>
Cc: Jonathan Behrens <behrensj@...>; Xinhaoqu (Freddie) <xinhaoqu@...>; Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>; tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 3:46 PM Bill Huffman <huffman@...> wrote:
That might mean that the sPMP being considered might need a probe of some sort.
I'd tend to think that the user processes running under sPMP will have few enough data regions that software base-and-bounds checks on syscall arguments isn't prohibitively expensive.
Bill
On 10/30/20 3:39 PM, Jonathan Behrens wrote:
In the worst case, a software page table walk isn't that expensive.
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 2:46 PM Bill Huffman <huffman@...> wrote:
On 10/30/20 2:32 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) <xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions
lower their privilege level so that if they end up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations
that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR
has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then,
it engages SUM and performs the unprivileged access.
That's, of course, a very Linux centric answer. With more general address maps - or a "bare MMU" - the problem is harder to solve. Do you have an expectation for that case?
It's not especially Linux-centric; it's more conventional-OS-with-paging-centric.
mstatus.MPRV handles the situation adequately for PMP-based protection in M/U systems.
S-mode with general address maps is not adequately addressed here, but at least at the moment, that strikes me as a bit too hypothetical of a problem. If we did need to solve it, an S-mode MPRV feature would also suffice.
Bill
Regards,
Freddie
From:
tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc: tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 3:46 PM Bill Huffman < huffman@...> wrote:
That might mean that the sPMP being considered might need a probe of some sort. I'd tend to think that the user processes running under sPMP will have few enough data regions that software base-and-bounds checks on syscall arguments isn't prohibitively expensive.
Bill
On 10/30/20 3:39 PM, Jonathan Behrens wrote:
EXTERNAL MAIL
In the worst case, a software page table walk isn't that expensive.
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 2:46 PM Bill Huffman < huffman@...> wrote:
On 10/30/20 2:32 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
EXTERNAL MAIL
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) < xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions lower their privilege level so that if they
end up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted
when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then, it engages SUM
and performs the unprivileged access.
That's, of course, a very Linux centric answer. With more general address maps - or a "bare MMU" - the problem is harder to solve. Do you have an expectation for that case?
It's not especially Linux-centric; it's more conventional-OS-with-paging-centric.
mstatus.MPRV handles the situation adequately for PMP-based protection in M/U systems.
S-mode with general address maps is not adequately addressed here, but at least at the moment, that strikes me as a bit too hypothetical of a problem. If we did need to solve it, an S-mode MPRV feature would also suffice.
Bill
Regards,
Freddie
From:
tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc:
tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
That might mean that the sPMP being considered might need a probe of some sort.
Bill
On 10/30/20 3:39 PM, Jonathan Behrens wrote:
toggle quoted message
Show quoted text
EXTERNAL MAIL
In the worst case, a software page table walk isn't that expensive.
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 2:46 PM Bill Huffman < huffman@...> wrote:
On 10/30/20 2:32 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
EXTERNAL MAIL
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) < xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions lower their privilege level so that if they
end up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted
when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then, it engages SUM
and performs the unprivileged access.
That's, of course, a very Linux centric answer. With more general address maps - or a "bare MMU" - the problem is harder to solve. Do you have an expectation for that case?
It's not especially Linux-centric; it's more conventional-OS-with-paging-centric.
mstatus.MPRV handles the situation adequately for PMP-based protection in M/U systems.
S-mode with general address maps is not adequately addressed here, but at least at the moment, that strikes me as a bit too hypothetical of a problem. If we did need to solve it, an S-mode MPRV feature would also suffice.
Bill
Regards,
Freddie
From:
tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc:
tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
On 10/30/20 3:25 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
EXTERNAL MAIL
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 2:46 PM Bill Huffman < huffman@...> wrote:
On 10/30/20 2:32 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
EXTERNAL MAIL
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) < xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions lower their privilege level so that if they
end up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted
when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then, it engages SUM
and performs the unprivileged access.
That's, of course, a very Linux centric answer. With more general address maps - or a "bare MMU" - the problem is harder to solve. Do you have an expectation for that case?
It's not especially Linux-centric; it's more conventional-OS-with-paging-centric.
Yes, I overstated a bit. But embedded address maps vary quite a bit more than Linux address maps.
mstatus.MPRV handles the situation adequately for PMP-based protection in M/U systems.
S-mode with general address maps is not adequately addressed here, but at least at the moment, that strikes me as a bit too hypothetical of a problem. If we did need to solve it, an S-mode MPRV feature would also suffice.
I have wondered whether we'd want a state bit, maybe in the security register, that said sstatus.sum meant data accesses were made as user rather than as either user or supervisor.
Or maybe the HLV*/HSV* instructions might be used more broadly for privilege control, not only with hypervisors.
Bill
Bill
Regards,
Freddie
From:
tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc:
tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
Jonathan Behrens <behrensj@...>
In the worst case, a software page table walk isn't that expensive.
toggle quoted message
Show quoted text
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 2:46 PM Bill Huffman < huffman@...> wrote:
On 10/30/20 2:32 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
EXTERNAL MAIL
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) < xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions lower their privilege level so that if they
end up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted
when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then, it engages SUM
and performs the unprivileged access.
That's, of course, a very Linux centric answer. With more general address maps - or a "bare MMU" - the problem is harder to solve. Do you have an expectation for that case? It's not especially Linux-centric; it's more conventional-OS-with-paging-centric.
mstatus.MPRV handles the situation adequately for PMP-based protection in M/U systems.
S-mode with general address maps is not adequately addressed here, but at least at the moment, that strikes me as a bit too hypothetical of a problem. If we did need to solve it, an S-mode MPRV feature would also suffice.
Bill
Regards,
Freddie
From:
tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc:
tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 2:46 PM Bill Huffman < huffman@...> wrote:
On 10/30/20 2:32 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
EXTERNAL MAIL
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) < xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions lower their privilege level so that if they
end up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted
when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then, it engages SUM
and performs the unprivileged access.
That's, of course, a very Linux centric answer. With more general address maps - or a "bare MMU" - the problem is harder to solve. Do you have an expectation for that case? It's not especially Linux-centric; it's more conventional-OS-with-paging-centric.
mstatus.MPRV handles the situation adequately for PMP-based protection in M/U systems.
S-mode with general address maps is not adequately addressed here, but at least at the moment, that strikes me as a bit too hypothetical of a problem. If we did need to solve it, an S-mode MPRV feature would also suffice.
Bill
Regards,
Freddie
From:
tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc:
tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
On 10/30/20 2:32 PM, Andrew Waterman wrote:
EXTERNAL MAIL
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) < xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions lower their privilege level so that if they
end up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted
when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then, it engages SUM
and performs the unprivileged access.
That's, of course, a very Linux centric answer. With more general address maps - or a "bare MMU" - the problem is harder to solve. Do you have an expectation for that case?
Bill
Regards,
Freddie
From:
tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc:
tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Thanks Andrew, I’d forgotten about SUM bit!
But.
It means the privilege with which S-mode loads and store access virtual memory cannot be used for specific addresses (i.e. check the function parameters of a syscall) avoiding the sstatus update overhead, right?
According to the manual, “Operating systems can execute the majority of code with SUM clear; the few code segments that
should access user memory can temporarily set SUM.” the SUM must be temporary set and unset per syscall, then.
My experience has been that, in the grand scheme of the cost of the syscall, the sstatus writes don't have a major effect on performance. (Also, many syscalls don't need to access user memory, since args are passed and returned in registers; and many syscalls that do access user memory do so in bulk, amortizing the cost of the sstatus writes across many memory accesses, cache misses, etc.)
Changes to the sstatus fields SUM take effect immediately, without the need to execute
an SFENCE.VMA instruction, so we cannot really consider this set/unset an overhead, probably.
Any (historical or practical) reason to avoid solutions like ad-hoc privileged instructions for this purpose?
At the time, we felt it was best to conserve opcode space and keep the ISA simpler.
(For somewhat different reasons, the hypervisor extension has chosen to add new instructions for accessing guest OS memory.)
|
|
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:19 AM Xinhaoqu (Freddie) < xinhaoqu@...> wrote:
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions lower their privilege level so that if they end
up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted
when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Right. SUM can be used to solve the same problem as LDTR/STTR, but it is not equivalent. To avoid the concern you describe, the Linux kernel first performs a bounds check to guarantee the address is in the user process' VA range. Then, it engages SUM and performs the unprivileged access.
Regards,
Freddie
From: tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc: tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
Hi Andrew,
I’m not sure the sstatus.SUM bit is providing the equivalent of LDTR/STTR. The pair of load/store instructions lower their privilege level so that if they end
up access privileged locations, they will fault. On the other hand, when status.SUM==1, even if the page is marked as “User”, supervisor code can still access it.
From section 3.1.6.3 in the Privileged ISA spec:
The SUM (permit Supervisor User Memory access) bit modifies the privilege with which S-mode
loads and stores access virtual memory. When SUM=0, S-mode memory accesses to pages that are
accessible by U-mode (U=1 in Figure 4.17) will fault. When SUM=1, these accesses are permitted.
SUM has no effect when page-based virtual memory is not in effect. Note that, while SUM is
ordinarily ignored when not executing in S-mode, it is in effect when MPRV=1 and MPP=S. SUM
is hardwired to 0 if S-mode is not supported.
There is nothing mentioning what would happen if load/store instructions in S-mode attempt locations that require privilege. That means to me they are permitted
when sstatus.SUM==1. This behaviour is fine in itself, but doesn’t match what the LDTR/STTR instructions do. I think sstatus.SUM’s equivalent is PSTATE.PAN, not LDTR/STTR. In other words, LDTR/STTR has no equivalent in RISC-V, AFAIK.
Regards,
Freddie
toggle quoted message
Show quoted text
From: tech-privileged@... [mailto:tech-privileged@...]
On Behalf Of Andrew Waterman
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 9:50 AM
To: Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Cc: tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-privileged] Access unprivileged regions from OS
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions."
According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Thanks Andrew, I’d forgotten about SUM bit!
But.
It means the privilege with which S-mode loads and store access virtual memory cannot be used for specific addresses (i.e. check the function parameters of a syscall) avoiding the sstatus update overhead, right?
According to the manual, “Operating systems can execute the majority of code with SUM clear; the few code segments that
should access user memory can temporarily set SUM.” the SUM must be temporary set and unset per syscall, then.
Changes to the sstatus fields SUM take effect immediately, without the need to execute
an SFENCE.VMA instruction, so we cannot really consider this set/unset an overhead, probably.
Any (historical or practical) reason to avoid solutions like ad-hoc privileged instructions for this purpose?
|
|
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions." According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called.
Yeah. Set the sstatus.SUM bit, then use regular load and store instructions to access user memory, then clear sstatus.SUM.
Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|
Andrea Mondelli <andrea.mondelli@...>
Hi all,
quoting the arm manual, "sometimes the OS does need to access unprivileged regions, for example, to write to a buffer owned by an application. To support this, the instruction set provides the LDTR and STTR instructions." According to the Volume II: RISC-V Privileged Architectures Chapter 7, In RISCV we don't have any similar privileged instruction to do it.
There is an alternative way to have the same behavior? I was thinking other examples like checking user parameters when syscall are called. Any hints?
thanks in advance
|
|