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[RISC-V] [tech-tee] comments on PMP enhancements
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Mr Tariq Kurd <tariq.kurd@...>
As we discussed on our previous call, I'm not against such a feature, as Andy pointed out, it is a useful debug
a) It should be disabled by default.
Thanks for the feedback, and I understand your arguments.
When you say "It" above are you talking about:
1. my original proposal (DMC and DPL)
2. my updated proposal (M-bit in each PMP entry)
The best solution for us would be the M-bit in each PMP entry and also DMC, as this gives us the smallest PMP hardware for our embedded cores.
I can write a two proposals, one for the M-bit and one for DMC and email them if you like
From: tech-tee@... [mailto:tech-tee@...] On Behalf Of John Hauser
Sent: 14 February 2020 20:57
To: tech-tee@...; tech-privileged@...
Subject: Re: [RISC-V] [tech-tee] comments on PMP enhancements
Nick Kossifidis wrote:
You don't need to do a ROP attack on BootROM to remove the rules, anyI'd like to point out that my own proposal does always allow for the locking of regions for the next boot stages, when that's appropriate.
When defining security controls there are guarantees we put in place.If unlocked M-mode PMP entries can't be called security controls, then fine, let's call them something else. As I see it, the point is that there is a demand/need for such an ability, it obviously involves PMP, and furthermore it's been shown that the physical mechanisms are very close to one another. If you ignore this other need and adopt the current proposal, there's a very good chance we'll end up having to retrofit the PMP table to support this other need later, creating a bigger mess than if we learn to accomodate it now.
I understand you're afraid that offering any compromises in the PMP mechanism will allow developers to choose the not-totally-secure options and delude themselves that it gives them true security.
But that's not a hardware-mechanisms problem; that's a problem for software policies and their enforcement. That concern needs to be dealt with in a different way than by hobbling the hardware.
For my part, I will try to be much more careful about my use of the words "secure" and "security" going forward.
- John Hauser
Στις 2020-02-17 11:02, Mr Tariq Kurd έγραψε:
Hi Nick,I'm referring to your original proposal of a bit that when set allows for locked rules to be removed / edited (DPL) temporarily. I also see some value as I mentioned for the DMC bit you also proposed and it seems others believe it would be useful, although it can be implemented differently. I understand that you want to be flexible to allow both locked and unlocked rules for M-mode with the per-entry M bit but to me this introduces a security risk and doesn't provide any security benefits.
As we discussed on our conf call we can simply add the two bits you propose on mseccfg introduced on the group's proposal, if you agree with having them disabled by default (to also be backwards compatible), not define DPL as a security control (DMC on the other hand is a security control and we can define it as such), and allow DPL to be locked (possibly with another bit) so that it can't be re-enabled after sw is done using it.
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