- [RFC PATCH 1/1] server extension: PCIe requirements
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] server extension: PCIe requirements
On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 4:02 PM Greg Favor <gfavor@...
On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 2:28 PM Josh Scheid <jscheid@...
+For security reasons, platforms are required to provide a mechanism to
+restrict the inbound accesses over PCIe to certain specific regions in
+the address space such as the DRAM.
While a standard IOMMU is further off, is the current opinion that the IOPMP is not in a position to be required or suggested as an implementation of the above requirement? If not, then it's hard to check for compliance.
I'm not sure if an IOPMP could be used for this particular purpose, but more generally IOPMP is being driven by embedded people and isn't consciously thinking about functionality requirements implied by H-style virtualization, or PCIe MSIs, or other PCIe features. In this regard IOPMP is analogous to PLIC and CLIC - and not generally suitable for OS/A platforms (and presumably is well-suited for M platforms).
I understand that IOPMP is not an IOMMU, but to the extent that it is a general "bus master memory protection" widget, it can be used by M-mode to ensure simple things, such as that S-mode-SW-controlled PCIe initiators can not access address regions not accessible by S-mode. There's value in memory protection even without full virtualization support. I'm questioning how vague the memory protection "requirement" should be to the extent that it ends up being usable and sufficient to provide a defined level of assurance.
For example, the platform spec could avoid mentioning the IOPMP proposal, but state that the platform is required to have a mechanism to allow M-mode SW to control (including prevent) PCIe initiator access to regions of system address space. While remaining open to custom implementations, it's clear on the functional intent.
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